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Mission command is a leadership philosophy that was designed to ensure that military 
organizations could operate effectively in uncertain situations. It has become the exemplar of 
military leadership (Shamir, 2011). This study explores whether an increase in task 
uncertainty is positively related to appreciation of mission command by crew members of 
Norwegian state-of-the-art, Nansen-class frigates (N = 174). The result of a simultaneous 
multiple regression indicate that there is a relationship, but in the opposite direction of what 
was hypothesized. The greater the task uncertainty, the more the behavior of the preferred 
leader deviated from mission command. The most important predictor was perceived lack of 
information, and the more the respondents felt that they lacked information when carrying 
out their tasks, the more their description of preferred leader behavior deviated from mission 
command. 
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Task Uncertainty and Mission Command in a Naval Context 
 This paper presents data on the relationship between followers and leaders in the context of 
Norwegian warships, the Nansen class frigates. Practicing the military profession is characterized by 
teamwork (Espevik, 2011; Jacobsen & Krabberød, 2012; Norwegian Defence Staff, 2007}. 
Researchers have found that the presence of others, like teammates, will affect a person’s task 
performance (Passer & Smith, 2007) and it is argued that that people involved in teamwork are more 
vulnerable to the effect of others’ decisions and actions (Edmundson, 2012). For one, in teams on 
different levels of maturity there will be different expectations to the leadership function (i.e. to which 
degree the formal leader should take care of the team’s needs like nurture, commitment, productivity 
and innovative thinking, not to mention who are expected and allowed to act as a leader, Sjøvold, 
2007). For example, will team members appreciate a leader who expects team members to take 
responsibility in new and uncertain situations instead of enforcing structure? Conversely, will the 
group accept that an ordinary team member takes initiative and present an alternative and new 
solution?  
 Researches have emphasized that it is important that the team leader sets the standards and 
ensures good and functional climate in the team (Edmundson, 2012; Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005). 
Interestingly, Avolio (2007) claims that the followers (i.e. the team members) have been neglected in 
research on leadership. Avolio (2007) further claims, ”leadership development theory and research 
has focused on changing the leader, with much less attention given to the interaction of leaders, 
followers and context.” (p. 30).  
 Mission command is a leadership philosophy that enjoys near “mythical canonization” when 
it comes to coordinating individual efforts into teamwork in the military domain, and is formally 
implemented by many modern military organizations (Shamir, 2011, p. 5), including the Norwegian 
armed forces (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2012; Norwegian Defense Staff, 2007). It is claimed to be 
the historically most effective way of organizing military (land) forces to deal with their defining 
problem (i.e. uncertainty, van Creveld, 1985). In addition to being characterized as uncertain, today’s 
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military operations are increasingly complex. An increase in the degree of complexity and uncertainty 
in the environment will put demands on how a team must function in order to be effective demands 
that are different from teams operating in a predictable environment (Edmundson, 2012).  
 The  U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012) states that 
“training for mission command is about building teams” (p. 7). This view is shared by the Norwegian 
Chief of Defence, who states that the philosophy necessitates that leadership becomes a collective 
process (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2012). Keeping an eye on the external world, monitoring 
processess, and acting to excerting corrective meassures if necessary is not solely the formal leader’s 
job. This responsibility lies on every team member (Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, 2009).  
In immature teams, team members tend to stick to what they are good at and fulfill functions 
within their comfort zone, and it is the leader who is expected to decide whether a team needs to 
reorient and to initiate corrections, if the leader decides to do so. Sjøvold (2007, p. 625) describes this 
as “one-person-one-functional-role” groups, which can be effective when performing simple and 
predictable tasks. However, the rigidity of one-function restricts flexibility and due to this Sjøvold 
(2007) reasons that in unpredictable and complex environments, problems are best solved by mature 
groups. In mature teams all  members, not just the formal leader, will “hunt for new ideas, critizise the 
‘the way things are done,’ and keep an eye on external forces” (Sjøvold, 2007, p. 626). All members 
of mature teams are capable, and just as importantly, have the opportunity to contribute without being 
restricted by role expectations (Sjøvold, 2007). 
In a treatise on military organization at sea, uncertainty is defined as “imperfect 
correspondence between information and environment” (Palmer, 2005, p. 319). For example: 
Where is the enemy? What will the consequences of our actions be? How much time do we 
have to make a decision? To van Creveld (1985), an authority on the history of military 
organization, certainty is the product of two factors, “the amount of information available for 
decision making and the nature of the task to be performed” (p. ??). Thus, when confronted 
with a task that involves uncertainty, a team has two basic options: It can increase its 
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information-processing capacity or it can design its modus operandi to enable it to operate on 
the basis of less information (i.e., a higher level of uncertainty, van Creveld, 1985). The 
problem with the first approach is that time is a limited and critical factor in military 
operations (Boyd, 1987), and endeavoring to achieve a higher degree of certainty by 
collecting more information or by sending requests for clarification up the chain of command 
will be time-consuming. Mission command is a philosophy that is based on the second 
approach, a willingness to accept greater uncertainty in order to save time (van Creveld, 
1985). Decentralization is seen as the most effective means of ensuring continuous adaptation 
to unfolding events in a time-competitive environment. The most important objective of 
mission command is to reduce the need for communication in the organizational hierarchy 
(i.e. teams and team members must be able to act autonomously but still coordinated; Boyd, 
1987; Shamir, 2011; van Creveld, 1985).  
However, uncertainty implies things beyond our control, which normally generates 
anxiety (Schmitt & Klein, 1996). It is thus somewhat paradoxical that mission command, 
which is claimed to be the historically most effective means of organizing for uncertainty, is 
based on something people are generally expected not to like, operating with greater 
uncertainty. Several studies have also highlighted difficulties when it comes to implementing 
mission command in military organizations (e.g., Borgmann & Aronsen, 2005; Muth, 2011; 
Shamir, 2011;).  
Moreover, there is a lack of research on the implementation and use of mission 
command in the naval context. Mission command is prescribed as the common leadership 
philosophy for all services in the Norwegian armed forces (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2007). 
From a contingency perspective, this makes one question whether the challenges are basically 
the same for an army team operating in Afghanistan and a damage control team on board a 
naval vessel. Researchers have claimed that if the context is changed, leadership will change 
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(e.g., Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & Cavarretta, 2009; Mintzberg, 2009; Nissestad, 2007). An 
interesting exception is a survey (Borgmann & Aronsen,2005) that found that only 23.2% of 
officers from operational units in the Royal Norwegian Navy adhered to the mission 
command philosophy principles, instead of a more directive, micro-managing leadership 
style. Borgmann and Aronsen’s (2005) conclusion was that a transformation is needed, not of 
organizational maps and formal procedures, but a transformation to “shape our minds” (p. 
115).   
According to Shamir (2011), institutionalizing mission command may entail a 
transformation of individual and organizational basic assumptions. Basic assumptions are the 
deeper, implicit beliefs people hold. As Schein (2004) puts it, “someone who does not hold 
them is viewed as a ‘foreigner’ or as a ‘crazy’ and is automatically dismissed” (p. 25). The 
importance of this aspect is explicitly underscored in implicit leadership theory, in which it is 
claimed that individuals have implicit beliefs that distinguish leaders from followers, and 
effective leaders from ineffective leaders (House & Ravidan, 2004). Thus, if mission 
command is consistent with implicitly held effective leadership theories, leaders would be 
expected to act in accordance with the formal mission command philosophy to be regarded as 
effective and appreciated in uncertain situations, in which mission command historically has 
proven to be the most effective leadership norm.  
This study explores whether an increase in task uncertainty is positively related to 
increased appreciation of mission command by crew members of Norwegian state-of-the-art, 
Nansen-class frigates. 
Mission Command 
 Prussia’s defeat by Napoleon in the battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 is said to have 
been the starting point for a groundbreaking reorganization of how the Prussian army fought, 
which led to the establishment of the mission command philosophy (Shamir, 2011). The 
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army went from being trained to act like a gigantic machine in which each soldier and officer 
played his part in the preplanned, standardized drill controlled from above, and it was 
recognized that the organization of military units in war was too complex to be directed by 
one man at the top. There were too many exceptions, too many unpredictable situations. A 
higher degree of agility was required than was achievable when the whole organization was 
micro-managed (Shamir, 2011).   
A gap was to be expected between what was planned and actual events. The 
responsibility for filling or utilizing this gap (i.e., to judge the situation and take the initiative) 
according to the commanders’ intention – was decentralized first to division commanders and 
finally became the responsibility of every soldier from the highest general to the lowliest 
private (Shamir, 2011). This reform led to the formation of an army, the German army, which 
in the Second World War had “developed fighting power to an almost awesome degree” (van 
Creveld, 1982, p. 4), and it is claimed that this is the only historically proven method of 
subordinates being given freedom to act on their own (Silva, 1989).  
However, as several authors have pointed out, there are challenges in trying to copy 
or simply translate a foreign, historical concept (e.g., Hughes, 1986; Shamir, 2011; van 
Creveld, 1982). The lengthy description of the essential norm of mission command in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine thus seems justified:  
The fundamental command philosophy of the Armed Forces is mission command. 
This means that commanders at different levels give direction by stating what is to be 
achieved and why it is to be achieved. Within this framework, subordinates are 
basically then given the freedom to fulfill the task as they think best. This philosophy 
is chosen for the reason that it allows room for initiative to be exercised at all levels. 
Because its effect is inclusive and stimulates participation at all levels in the 
organization, it also provides the greatest robustness against the frictions of combat. 
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Mission command is a philosophy which goes beyond the assignment of tasks and the 
allocation of resources. The philosophy is about having a culture of professionalism 
and mutual trust. (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2007, p. 163) 
Mission command was formally adopted as the leadership philosophy for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces in 1995. As in Prussia, mission command was implemented into 
Norwegian doctrine in order to improve performance as a response to after action learning. In 
Norway’s case, it was the lessons learned after a tragic accident in 1986 in which 16 soldiers 
died that initiated the process of implementing mission command as the official leadership 
doctrine (Offerdal & Jacobsen, 1993). 
The Naval Context 
 In a classic study comparing German and U.S. army performance during the Second 
World War, van Creveld (1982) highlights the importance of what he calls the intrinsic 
qualities of a military units: those somewhat intangible qualities such as initiative, trust, 
cohesion and courage. These qualities are the organizational foundations, what makes a 
military unit fight. Van Creveld (1982) labels these intrinsic qualities as “fighting power”: 
“Though good equipment can, up to a point, make up for deficient fighting power (the 
reverse is also true) an army lacking the latter is, at best, a brittle instrument” (p. 3).  
When introducing the anatomy of naval battle, Reeve (2003) makes the same 
argument as van Creveld (i.e., that “people have always mattered most in the outcome of 
naval warfare,” p. 4). However, while there is an abundance of research discussing fighting 
power in relation to armies, far less research seems to have been conducted on Fighting 
Power in the naval domain (Spector, 2001,; Wombacher & Felfe, 2012,). 
A great disadvantage for military organizations is that they only periodically have an 
opportunity to practice their profession: “This is less true for navies than armies, because the 
former must always contend with the sea” (Murray, 2011, p. 8).1 A vessel at sea is perhaps 
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the closest one can get to a delimited and what Anand and Daft (2007) call a self-contained 
organization, where input arrives at the gangway and, when the vessel has left the quay, 
almost everything needed to produce its product – fighting power – is supplied internally, 
thus a navy vessel must be self-reliant (Barnett, 2009). Work on a vessel at sea is a 
continuous task. The crew must be able at all times to survive the forces of nature and 
internal threats such as fire and flooding, regardless of whether the vessel is involved in 
warfare or not. According to Barnett (2009) “The environment is inherently hostile; 
teamwork is required merely to survive” (p. 13). In contrast to veterans of land warfare, who 
often claim that the experience of combat was unlike anything they had experienced, “sailors 
often say that they found themselves doing virtually the same job in combat as in peacetime 
drills” (Spector, 2001, p. 396). As one sailor put it in an interview after the Falklands War: “It 
was just like Portsmouth,” which is a Royal Navy training facility (Wastell, 2003, p. 304). 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that how a ship’s organization functions in 
peacetime should predict how the ship will function in war.  
However, prescribing mission command as the leadership doctrine for all military 
units (i.e., leadership is exercised in the same way on board a large navy vessel as on board a 
small submarine or by a coastal ranger squad in Afghanistan) would appear to be in contrast 
to the perspective in which leadership is context-dependent (Hannah et al., 2009). Since 
mission command was developed for the Prussian army more than 200 years ago, it should be 
fruitful to explore the relationship between task uncertainty and appreciation of mission 
command in the context of a state-of-the-art naval warship. Are there similarities that 
outweigh the differences when it comes to exercising leadership on board a large navy vessel 
and, for example, an army unit in Afghanistan? 
One important difference that is claimed to exist between army units and naval 
vessels is that “in ships at sea, the men go where the leaders go” (Hughes, 2000, p. 28). There 
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is nowhere to run. While Hughes is most concerned with unit morale, another important 
aspect of that observation is that it should reduce the need for internal communication. 
However, on the other hand, Palmer (2005) argues that, even though there are important 
contextual differences between naval and land operations, uncertainty is “just as prevalent 
afloat as van Creveld found it to be in his study of generalship ashore” (p. 16). As a result, 
Palmer (2005) claims that “decentralized approaches as exemplified by Nelson are on the 
whole superior” (p. 16). Palmer does not explicitly refer to mission command, but it is 
claimed that Nelson is one of history’s greatest proponents of mission command (Heyward, 
2003). Thus, it would seem reasonable to expect mission command to be relevant in a naval 
context as well.   
Uncertainty and Leadership 
According to the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine, armed conflict is 
characterized by friction, which refers to things that happen that separate a plan on paper 
from its actual execution; uncertainty and chaos, which describe a situation in which 
information is lacking, incomplete or contradictory; and, finally, danger and stress as a result 
of, for example, direct threats, the dangers of the cruel sea and loneliness (Norwegian 
Defence Staff, 2007).  
In a discussion of leadership under extreme conditions, Hannah et al. (2009) point to 
conflicting findings in the literature on what is perceived as effective leadership. There is 
research claiming that subordinates facing a threat will look to leaders who initiate structure 
and take decisive, authoritative action. However, Hannah et al. (2009) suggest that the focus 
on the team leader’s task competence in critical situations may indicate that a culture for a 
participative leadership style has not been established prior to the critical situation. Thus, 
there may be a group culture that is characterized by what Sjøvold (2007) calls dependence. 
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In such a culture the appropriate thing to do is be passive and to await the instructions from a 
strong leader, like soldiers in a trench waiting for orders (Sjøvold, 2007).  
On the other hand, there is research showing that leaders who displayed greater 
receptivity to input from followers and integrated the efforts of team members were found to 
be effective (Hannah et al. 2009), which could be an indication of a more mature group 
culture (i.e. a team where all the members are proactive and will try to influence what is 
happening; Sjøvold, 2007). The contrast to a team with soldiers in a trench waiting for their 
orders is aptly illustrated by Lupfer (1981) who describes how the German army during the 
First World War enhanced the effectiveness of their defense in depth. Since timing was 
critical the decision to start the counterattack was not centralized to the headquarters, but to 
the smallest units. The German doctrine actually “forbade wasting time by waiting for 
permission from higher headquarters” (Lupfer, 1981, p.20). The Germans fostered a culture 
characterized by initiative, not reactivity. Soldiers were not expected to wait passively for 
orders in the trenches, but to be actively looking for the right time to start the counterattack. 
Hannah et al. (2009) argue that it is important to explore the question of “whether followers 
and groups have different models or implicit theories of optimum leader prototypes for 
differing dimensions of extreme contexts” (p. 908) 
Since mission command is the leadership philosophy that has proven historically to be 
the most effective means of organizing for situations characterized by uncertainty (Shamir, 
2011; van Creveld, 1985), it seems reasonable to expect that the more crew members 
perceive their tasks as being characterized by uncertainty, the more they will appreciate 
mission command. On the other hand, as pointed out above, uncertainty will generally 
generate anxiety and instead of trying to operate with less information, as mission command 
describes, it is claimed that military organizations have endeavored to increase their 
information processing capacity (McMaster, 2011).  
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In a study of uncertainty in military operations, Schmitt and Klein (1993) found that 
many of the information requirements that were sent up the chain of command were initiated 
“to relieve anxiety rather than out of any actual operational need” (p. 63). One of the assumed 
key reasons why organizations have not succeeded in implementing mission command, is 
that the willingness to take responsibility by being proactive and  filling gaps in situations 
where there is no preplanned response, may be counterintuitive and not consistent with 
people’s implicit leadership theories (Shamir, 2011). As Schmitt and Klein (1993) 
underscore, “the ultimate requirement is to be able to operate effectively in spite of 
uncertainty” (p. 66). Thus, it would be fruitful to explore the relationship between the implicit 
theory of leadership (appreciation of mission command) and the degree of task uncertainty.      
Hypothesis: An increase in task uncertainty will be positively related to appreciation 
of mission command. 
Method 
The participants in this study were 174 crew members from two Norwegian Nansen-
class frigates and four Norwegian experts on mission command.  
Measures 
Leadership behavior was measured using the Systematizing the Person-Group 
Relationship (SPGR) instrument (Sjøvold, 2006). The SPGR questionnaire consists of 24 
items that are rated on a three-point scale (rarely, sometimes, often). In SPGR, behavior is 
described along three basic dimensions labeled: Control-Nurture (C-N), Opposition – 
Dependence (O-D), and Withdrawal -Synergy (W-S). In this study, behavior is analyzed 
along 12 vectors, two for each of the basic dimensions (Sjøvold, 2006). The minimum value 
for each of the vectors is zero and the maximum value is nine.  
Each of the crew members was asked to rate the behavior of the leader they preferred 
during a specified complex naval exercise. Using the same instrument, four expert raters, 
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who were highly familiar with both the SPGR instrument and mission command, were asked 
to describe how participants cooperate in an organization that operates on the basis of the 
mission command norm. Three of the four expert raters had a naval background. See Table 1 
for descriptive statistics.  
Appreciation of mission command was measured as the deviation between a 
respondent’s description of the preferred leader and the average of the expert ratings of 
mission command behavior. That is, the smaller the deviation, the more the respondents 
appreciated a leader who behaved in accordance with the mission command norm.  
Shamir (2011) remarks that mission command that it is a “complex, elusive and 
multifaceted concept” (p. 202), which makes it difficult to quantify. To arrive at a measure of 
the degree of deviation between an empirical entity and a multivariate ideal type, the 
following formula proposed by Doty, Glick and Huber (1993) was used:  
 
Dio =  
where 
 Dio = the distance between ideal type i and empirical case o, 
 Xi = a 1 x j vector that represents the value of ideal type i for attribute j, 
 Xo = a 1 x j vector that represents the value of empirical case o for attribute j 
and 
W = a j x j diagonal matrix that represents the theoretical importance of attribute j to 
ideal type i. 
0 0( ) ( )
T
i iX X W X X− −
UNCERTAINTY MISSION COMMAND                                       14 
 
 
Thus, the smaller the value of Dio (i.e., the deviation), the more the best leader description 
resembles mission command.  Doty et al. (1993) suggest using expert raters to determine the 
level of each construct that best represents the ideal type.  
Task uncertainty. As pointed out by Schmitt and Klein (1993), uncertainty “engulfs 
every facet of military action” (p. 63). It covers many more aspects than gaps in information, 
e.g., risks, future states, complexity, time pressure and consequences. They also note that 
what is perceived as an uncertain situation is subjective; people have different perceptions of 
what is considered uncertain (Schmitt & Klein, 1993). In this study, uncertainty was  
subjectively measured  using nine single items that were intended to cover the most intuitive 
and central aspects.2 The respondents were asked to rate each of the items on a 5-point Likert 
scale (strongly disagree, undecided, disagree, agree, strongly agree). The items were: “Do 
you have to take many different factors into consideration?”, “Do you have to take new 
factors into consideration?”, “Do you have to make independent decisions quickly?”, “Can 
misjudgments have severe consequences?”, “Would you characterize your tasks as simple or 
complex?”, “Is information lacking when you have to perform your tasks?”, “Do you lack 
immediate feedback on the effect of executed tasks?”, “Is it difficult to predict the effect of 
executed tasks?”, and “Do you perform tasks according to standard procedures?”.  
Procedure 
The study was approved by the commanding officer of the Royal Norwegian Frigate 
Service and the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. Collecting data about individual crew 
members’ perception of their workplace involves an ethical aspect, most importantly that the 
data can be used against the employees (Cummings & Worley, 2009). The study design was 
provided to the Norwegian Social Science Data Service, and ethical aspects were discussed. 
In order to enable the respondents to give informed consent, several briefings were held about 
the research project, and the researcher was on board the frigates on several occasions and 
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available to answer any questions. Finally, each questionnaire started with a text informing 
the respondents about the project, how the data would be used, and promising anonymity. 
The questionnaire also included a question requesting respondents to give or withhold 
explicit consent to participate. Some crew members responded that they would not 
participate, which could indicate that asking for consent had the desired effect. On one 
occasion, the commanding officer of a vessel decided that no one from his crew should 
participate in the study. The data were converted to SPSS and Microsoft Excel for analysis. 
Results 
Of the 154 participants in the study,40% of the crew members are officers, 37% are 
enlisted, and 23% are conscripts (20 did not report). The crew members are divided into four 
functional specializations; 34% represent the operation branch, 20% logistics, 22 % machine 
engineers, and 24% weapon engineers (2 did not report). Table 1 presents the means and 
standard deviations for crew ratings of best leader behavior and the expert ratings of how 
crew members would cooperate according to a mission command norm along the 12 SPGR 
behavior vectors, as well as the deviation between best leader behavior and mission 
command. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations,  and Pearson correlations for the 
independent variables (task uncertainty) and the dependent variable (deviation from mission 
command). Table 3e presents the Pearson correlation for uncertainty items and the 12 SPGR 
vectors. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the degree of appreciation 
between the two crews. There was no significant difference between the two crews, t (172) 
=.29, p = . 78, two- tailed. 
In order to test the hypothesis, deviation from mission command was regressed on the 
nine uncertainty items. Table 4 presents the results of a simultaneous regression.  
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The overall model was statistically significant, R2 =.12,  F[9,164] = 2.545, p < .01. 
Item three (lack information when performing your tasks) was the strongest contributor to the 
prediction of the dependent variable (β = .29, p < 01). Item six (have to make independent 
decisions quickly) was the second strongest contribution, but just exceeded the .05 
significance level (β = .18, p = .051). However, the direction of the relationship was the 
opposite of what was hypothesized: The greater the task uncertainty, the more the description 
of the best leader deviated from mission command. Thus the hypothesis was not supported.  
Discussion 
This study provides new data on the appreciation of mission command in a naval context. 
That the two items that made the strongest contribution to predicting the deviation between 
description of best leader behavior and mission command behavior were “lack of 
information” and “make independent decisions fast” is consistent with the main rationale for 
mission command. That is, since certainty is a product of time and information,and time will 
be limited in a competitive environment, crew members have to make do with less 
information in order to save time (van Creveld, 1985).3 The most notable result in this study 
is that the more crew members’ description of their task fit a situation in which mission 
command should be relevant, at least according to the mission command theory, the more 
crew members’ description of their preferred leader’s behavior deviated from the mission 
command norm.  
If context is an important predictor of what leaders do and should do, the most 
immediate explanation seems to be that the naval context differs from the land context, where 
mission command originated and consequently, mission command may not be relevant. On 
the other hand, it is claimed that uncertainty is as prevalent at sea as on land (Palmer, 2005). 
Another explanation is the finding reported by Hannah et al. (2009) that in uncertain 
situations many employees appreciate an authoritative and instructive style of leadership.4 
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Mission command is a leadership philosophy with the premise that employees thrive on 
uncertainty. But uncertainty implies a need to relate to something new, which can temporarily 
destabilize our cognitive and interpersonal world and which most of us do not like (Schein, 
2004). An authoritative leader can function as an anxiety reducer in such situations. 
Consequently, if team members are not explicitly trained in mission command, a formal 
leader or another team member who has acted in accordance with the mission command 
norm might not be appreciated. Being an appreciated leader is not necessarily the same as 
being an effective leader, however. Becoming a mature team often implies that team 
members are willing and able to push their boundaries of individual comfort (Sjøvold, 2007,). 
Edmundson (2012) claims that to excel in in uncertain and complex environments one 
needs teams that embrace uncertainty. Several authors have shown that implementing 
mission command is a challenging enterprise (e.g., Nissestad, 2007; Shamir, 2011; van 
Creveld, 1982). It is claimed that mission command is a demanding leadership philosophy 
which requires explicit training (van Creveld, 1985, p. 271) and is “fundamentally a learned 
behavior” (U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 2012, p.  6). This study has identified two aspects of 
uncertainty that seems to warrant attention in future team development. A notable conclusion 
in Shamir’s (2011) study of  attempts to implement mission command is that, even if a 
military unit has successfully implemented mission command at one time, there is no 
guarantee that the same unit will automatically have the same cooperative climate over a 
period of years. Thus, operating according to the mission command norm seems to require 
continuous attention. 
One important limitation should be noted. It is challenging to quantify a complex 
social phenomenon like mission command, which has both a historical interpretation and a 
modern description. A list of cultural descriptions of a mission command culture will contain 
many characteristics that complement and even contradict each other (Shamir, 2011). Perhaps 
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a quantified instrument is not compatible with measuring something as complex as mission 
command culture Given the time-constrained training and preparation phase before a naval 
unit is declared operational, the enormous amounts spent on the military, and the widespread 
use of mission command, more attention should be devoted to establishing an instrument that 
can be used as a template for measuring mission command. The template used in this study is 
one approach. 
It is worth mentioning the lack of statistical relationship between deviation from 
mission command and the other uncertainty items. But, as Keegan (1988) has claimed, if 
there is one thing the long history of war (on land) has demonstrated, it is that the moments 
when the “flow of information upwards and orders downwards will most nearly match the 
pace of events – are very, very few” (p. 327). During the most recent significant conventional 
naval war, the Falklands War, the commander of the British task force stated with a sigh that 
“the battle for information is never-ending” (Woodward & Robinson, 1992, p. 198). The fact 
that a perceived lack of information is the most important predictor in this study is consistent 
with both Keegan’s lesson and Woodward’s reflection. This study has indicated that lack of 
information is still an important factor to consider, also in the naval context. Further research 
may wish to devote more attention to which aspects of lacking information are most 
important in relation to mission command: the internal aspects (e.g., I do not know what my 
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1 “Naval warfare is marked by the essentially singular interaction of professional military 
personnel with the ‘cruel sea’ . . . the sea is more powerful than war” (Reeve, 2003, p. 30). 
2 The questions are taken from a larger survey investigating the organizational context of 
naval leadership. 
3 The Prussian-German slogan was: “better a bad decision in time than a perfect decision 
taken too late” (Murray, 2011, p. 8). 
4 In the questionnaire used in this study, the respondents were asked two questions about 
micromanagement. They both correlated positively with the degree of deviation from mission 
command: the extent to which respondents appreciated being given detailed orders, r(172) = 
.22, p < .01); the extent to which they appreciated giving detailed orders, r(172) = .17, p < 
.05). According to Richards (2004), micromanagement is a sure way of undermining a 
mission command philosophy.  
  




SPGR Mean Scores (M), Standard Deviation (SD) for Crew Ratings of Best Leader and 
Expert Ratings of Mission Command 
  Crew Expert 
ratersa 
Variables Typical Behavior M SD M SD 
Control (C1) Controlling, autocratic, attentive to 
rules and Procedures 
4.74 2.38 5.06 1.13 
Task-orientation (C2)  Analytical, task-oriented, conforming 6.98 2.14 9.00 0.00 
Relations (N1) Taking care of others, attentive to 
relations 
6.34 2.25 5.06 1.13 
Creativity (N2) Creative, spontaneous 1.32 1.92 0.56 1.13 
Loyalty (D1) Obedient, conforming 6.50 2.03 4.50 1.84 
Acceptance (D2) Passive, accepting 6.72 2.24 6.19 1.13 
Criticism (O1) Critical, opposing 2.26 2.05 2.25 1.84 
Assertiveness (O2) Assertive, self-sufficient 3.34 2.38 2.81 2.15 
Resignation (W1) Sad appearance, showing lack of self-
confidence 
1.01 1.83 0.00 0.00 
Self-sacrifice (W2) Passive, reluctant to contribute 0.86 1.65 0.00 0.00 
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Engagement (S1) Engaged, inviting others to contribute 7.38 1.83 8.44 1.13 
Empathy (S2) Showing empathy and interest in 
others 
6.64 2.17 8.44 1.13 
Note. a Average measures ICC =.96. ICC was calculated as two way mixed model with 
absolute agreement. Inter-rater correlation [.81 to .95]   
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Table 2 
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations and Correlation Coefficients between Task Uncertainty Items and Deviation from Mission 
Command 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
1. Take many different factors into consideration 2.32 1.01 --           
2. Take new factors into consideration 2.13 .90 .70** --          
3. Lack information when you have to perform your tasks 1.39 .79 -.06 -.09 --         
4. Difficult to predict the effect of executed tasks 1.12 .81 .04 .07 .18* --        
5. Lack immediate feedback on the effect of executed tasks 1.47 1.05 -.11 -.13 .34** -.13 --       
6. Have to make independent decisions quickly 2.15 1.06 .51** .50** -.07 .06 -.15* --      
7. Misjudgments can have severe consequences 2.28 1.19 .53** .46** .02 .05 -.04 .51** --     
8. Characterize your tasks as simple or complex 2.12 .96 .56** .44** -.10 .06 -.07 .46** .51** --    
9. Perform tasks according to standard procedures 1.16 .85 .16* .16* .06 .03 .12 .17* .05 .12 --   
10. Deviation from mission command  7.90 2.55 -.13 .00 .35** -.04 .20** .01 .05 -.10 -.01 --  
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 (2-tailed) 





Correlation Coefficients between Task Uncertainty Items and SPGR Vectors 
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Control  -.09 -.16* -.09 -.05 -.02 -.14 -.08 -.14* -.21** 
Task-
orientation  .17* .07 -.43** -.11 -.24** -.02 .07 .15* -.01 
Relations  .07 .06 -.27** .02 -.29** -.04 -.05 .08 -.10 
Creativity -.20** -.05 .24** -.05 .15* .05 .06 -.24** .06 
Loyalty  .06 .07 -.28** .03 -.17* -.04 -.02 .06 -.04 
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Acceptance  .04 .07 -.22** -.01 -.15* -.08 -.15* .01 -.07 
Criticism  .00 .02 .07 .01 .03 .02 .12 -.10 -.03 
Assertiveness  -.21** -.10 .04 -.07 .06 -.03 .01 -.06 .02 
Resignation  -.03 .07 .23** -.16* .15* .05 .08 -.11 -.05 
Self-sacrifice  .02 .12 .26** -.15* .19** .14* .12 -.16* .06 
Engagement  .09 .05 -.29** .05 -.24** .00 -.06 .05 .04 
Empathy  .07 .05 -.30** .01 -.26** .05 -.03 .00 .09 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 (2-tailed)
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TABLE 4 




B SE β 
1. Take many different factors into consideration -.45 .27 -.19 
2. Take new factors into consideration .19 .29 .07 
3. Lack information when you have to perform 
your tasks 
.89 .25 .29** 
4. Difficult to predict the effect of executed tasks -.21 .24 -.07 
5. Lack immediate feedback on the effect of 
executed tasks 
.06 .19 .03 
6. Have to make independent decisions quickly .43 .22 .18 
7. Misjudgments can have severe consequences .07 .21 .03 
8. Characterize your tasks as simple or complex -.23 .25 -.09 
9. Performs tasks according to standard procedures .01 .23 .00 
Constant 6.78   
R2 .12**   









Tommy Krabberød is a Lieutenant Commander and lecturer on leadership at the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy, Bergen, Norway. His main research interest is organizing in a naval context, particularly 
exploring relations between teamwork, leadership and context.   
